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Abstract 
This paper explores the impact of foreign financial assistance on the promotion 
of domestic financial markets in the developing countries. It claims that the disbursing 
of large amounts of foreign aid may be a more complex exercise than is usually recog-
nized. The paper reviews the debate on the impact of foreign financial assistance on 
domestic savings flows and on the efficiency of investment. It explores the role of 
financial markets in economic growth and the elements of efforts to promote the 
development of those markets. Finally, it examines the role of foreign inflows in the 
process of adjustment to external shocks. From a new political-economy perspective, that 
explains fiscal crises in terms of the accumulation of entitlements to income transfers, 
it claims that the elasticities of response to adjustment programs are not independent of 
the amount of foreign aid received. By bailing governments out, aid allows otherwise 
unsustainable entitlements and distortions. The concepts are illustrated with a review of 
the Central American experience in the early 1980s. 
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Introduction 
During most of the 1980s, Costa Rica, as well as its Central American and 
Caribbean neighbors, have been in the midst of an acute financial and economic crisis, 
characterized by a stagnant and at times contracting output (GDP); by an even more rap-
id decline of their international trade, with sluggish export growth and a sharp reduction 
in their imports; by unemployment and underemployment well above their historical 
levels; by huge public-sector budget deficits and the corresponding growth of their pub-
lic external borrowing, followed by their inability to service this debt as it was originally 
contracted; by accelerating, either repressed or open inflation, and by the accompanying, 
explicit or implicit devaluation of their domestic currencies. 1 
These difficulties have been in sharp contrast with the record of rapid economic 
growth of the previous two decades, particularly after the creation of the Central 
American Common Market, and with an even more spectacular record of domestic price 
and exchange rate stability, that had lasted for several decades. These difficulties 
generated the worst economic crisis that this region of the world has experienced since 
the Great Depression of the 1930s, when a sharp decline in the international demand for 
and in the price of coffee and bananas, the area's main export crops, coupled with a 
substantial increase in the real value of the service of their external debt, severely 
impoverished these countries. 
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Last year, in examining the farm debt crisis of the 1980s in the United States, for 
his Myers Memorial lecture, Neil E. Harl attempted to derive some lessons from that 
experience, which could help to prevent its reocurring or, at least, help to cope with the 
accompanying trauma. 2 The experience of Costa Rica and of many other developing 
countries during the 1980s may offer lessons of interest, as well, as long as the essential 
similarities and major differences between the two episodes are kept in mind. 
Forei&n Assistance ProKrams 
Political turmoil, insurrection, and the doubtful prospects for long-term peace in 
Central America have attracted considerable international attention. Since economic 
stagnation and instability have been major dimensions of the recent history of the region, 
as well, it is not surprising that numerous plans and programs have been proposed to 
deal with these problems. 
The most common set of responses has been to request, on the one hand, and 
to offer, on the other, substantially increased flows of foreign financial assistance. As a 
key example, in mid-1983 President Reagan established a National Bipartisan Commis-
sion on Central America, headed by Dr. Henry Kissinger, to propose elements of a long-
term United States strategy for the region. In its 1984 Report, the Commission recom-
mended greatly expanded economic assistance. Legislation, known as the Central 
American Initiative, was then passed authorizing $ 8.4 billion in bilateral assistance for 
the fiscal years 1984-1989. 3 
Although the Commission recognized that "large-scale economic aid alone does not 
guarantee progress," and that "the effectiveness of increased economic assistance will de-
pend on the economic policies of the Central American countries themselves," in practice 
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the major legacy of the Commission has been the significantly increased flows of financial 
aid granted during these five years. 4 
The disbursing of large amounts of foreign financial aid may be a far more 
complex and difficult exercise than is usually recognized. A major question is the extent 
to which foreign aid and international financial flows, in general, can contribute to 
growth and stability in the developing nations. This is not an easy question to answer. 
The success of the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s and in the 1950s led many to 
believe that similar transfers of funds to the developing countries would permit their 
comparably spectacular transformation. It is thus not surprising to observe, for example, 
periodic calls for a "Marshall Plan for Central America." The optimism inherent in this 
view has been gradually replaced, however, by a better understanding of the complexities 
of the process of economic development. At the other end of the spectrum, a few 
economists have actually claimed that the absence of foreign aid is almost a prerequisite 
for economic progress in the developing countries. 5 
Financial Assistance and Economic Growth 
In the early days, emphasis on the role of foreign financial assistance was based 
on the implicit assumption that the key input in the process of economic growth was 
physical capital and that a shortage of investment, as a consequence of low domestic 
savings rates, was the critical bottleneck in the process of economic development. 6 
The validity of the presumption of a positive association between the volume of 
capital inflows and the rate of economic growth in the developing countries has not been 
demonstrated, however. The assumption has been that the foreign resources would add 
to the domestic savings, in order to increase total investment. Some of the available 
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empirical evidence shows, nevertheless, a negative relationship between the inflows of 
foreign financial assistance and the share of domestic savings in the gross domestic 
product. 7 
In effect, the foreign funds have frequently substituted for domestic savings, 
increasing both consumption levels and the extent of capital flight. The additionality of 
these foreign funds has thus been low. This should not be surprising, given the fun-
gibility of funds and a marginal propensity to save of less than one. Inevitably, given the 
foreign financial inflows, the recepients will allocate the extra resources partly for present 
and partly for future consumption. The extent of this leakage into consumption may be 
considerable, particularly when domestic incentives to save are distorted. 
Because funds are fungible, they have the effect of freeing resources for other uses 
and, as a result, actual changes in marginal resource allocation do not correspond to the 
intentions of the foreign aid program. 8 Moreover, even if the foreign funds were used 
solely for a productive investment project that otherwise would not have been under-
taken, future income and future wealth would rise and hence savings out of current 
measured income would fall. 9 
Furthermore, as economic agents see foreign debt rise, they may well anticipate 
increased future tax burdens for its servicing and they will, therefore, have incentives to 
transfer assets abroad. A most striking example of this behavior is the extent to which, 
in several of the large debtor countries, private capital outflows have eroded the net 
inflows. It has been estimated that up to a half or more of the increase in the gross in-
debtedness of Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela during 1974-1982 was offset by private 
capital outflows. 10 
,. 
5 
These capital outflows mean that borrowing by these countries added much less 
to domestic resources than was originally thought. In effect, in the 1980s, domestic fixed 
capital formation actually declined in the major Latin American countries. Moreover, 
since funds invested abroad usually escape the tax base of the borrowing-country govern-
ment, these outflows have increased the cost to these countries of raising revenue to 
service their debt and have thus reduced their prospects for debt repayment. 11 
The link of foreign financial assistance with the rate of economic growth through 
the levels of savings and investment may thus be weak. Of greater concern, moreover, 
is the impact of foreign aid on the efficiency of domestic resource allocation. Foreign 
aid flows, for example, tend to overvalue the domestic currency and thereby have a 
negative impact on the competitiveness of the country's exports. 12 
It has been claimed, in addition, that government-to-government aid can easily 
contribute to unproductive investment and to the perpetuation of interventionist economic 
policies that increase capital-output ratios. A leading Guatemalan wrote for the Wall 
Street Journal that "the combination of have-money-must-lend international institutions 
and of spendthrift politicians has been one of the main causes of the sad state of 
economic affairs in Latin America." 13 
This is not the place, however, to explore the causes of the wealth of nations or 
the complexities of the process of economic development. Since the time of the Marshall 
Plan, nevertheless, our understanding of the development process has deepened signifi-
cantly, beyond the view of physical capital as the main input lacking for economic growth 
in the developing world. Current thinking places equal emphasis on human capital 
formation, on well-functioning markets, and on the role of international trade, of 
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entrepreneurship, of technological innovations, and of policies that encourage competition, 
for increased efficiency and growth. Financial deepening is also highlighted as a deter-
minant of economic growth. 
What matters is the accumulation of resources, in both a quantitative and a 
qualitative sense, as well as an increased efficiency in resource use, from the economic, 
managerial, and engineering perspectives. Achievement of these goals depends on many 
factors, including the incentives facing individuals for the accumulation and efficient use 
of resources as well as the development and improvement of markets, through the pro-
motion of the public and private institutional frameworks (property rights, contracts, 
market networks), government provision of infrastructural services and public goods (such 
as agricultural research and extension services), and the removal of the government-
imposed impediments to economic efficiency, including the set of price interventions and 
regulations that drive a wedge between private and social profitability. 14 
Financial Deepenin2 and Economic Development 
Following the seminal work of Edward S. Shaw, Ronald I. McKinnon, and their 
followers, the role of the financial system and the nature of its contributions to economic 
growth have received increasing attention. 15 These contributions can be associated with 
the provision of at least four types of services. The most basic is the monetization of 
the economy; that is, the provision of a means of payments. 
Monetization services reduce the costs of conducting transactions in the markets 
for commodities and for factors of production, increase the flow of trade, and enlarge 
market size. In turn, through specialization and the division of labor, greater 
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competition, the use of modern technologies, and the exploitation of economies of scope 
and of economies scale, these effects increase the productivity of available resources. 
The efficiency of the monetization effort is reduced by inflation and by currency 
substitution ( dollarization). In order to avoid the negative impact of the inflation tax, 
economic agents substitute tangible assets (real estate, inventories, jewelry) and foreing 
currencies for the domestic money. The domestic currency is no longer considered to 
be an efficient medium of exchange and store of value. The funds shifted into inflation 
hedges provide limited social returns, however. Correct macroeconomic management, 
in order to avoid inflation, is thus crucial for the adequate monetization of a developing 
economy. 
The financial system provides services of intermediation between savers and 
investors, thus enhancing the accumulation of capital and improving its allocation. In the 
absence of financial markets, many producers are condemned to take advantage of their 
productive opportunities only to the extent allowed by their own endowment of resources. 
In other cases, when their resources are abundant compared to their productive options, 
savers are forced to invest those resources at low, private and social, marginal rates of 
return. 
There is no reason to expect that those with the capacity to ,save, at a given 
moment, are necessarily those with the best investment opportunities. By making the 
division of labor between savers and investors possible, financial intermediaries channel 
resources from producers, activities, and regions with a limited growth potential and poor 
productive opportunities, to those where a more rapid expansion of output is possible. 
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Through the provision of intermediation services, therefore, the financial system 
not only promotes productive uses of resources, but it also contributes to the elimination 
of inferior uses of resources. This is accomplished when the financial system offers 
wealthholders new assets (for example, bank deposits) that are more attractive forms of 
holding wealth than the less profitable uses of resources thereby eliminated. The inter-
mediary, in tum, transfers these claims on resources to others, who possess better 
investment opportunities. From this perspective, the financial system offers valuable ser-
vices and income-increasing opportunities not only to borrowers, but also to depositors. 
Financial policies must create a balance, therefore, between the incentives offered 
to depositors (to attract their savings) and those offered to borrowers (to promote invest-
ment). Many credit programs and institutions in the Central American and other 
developing countries have relied heavily upon international donor funds, government 
transfers, and central bank rediscounting for their lending programs, thus ignoring the 
provision of deposit services. 
The financial system facilitates the pooling, pricing, and exchanging of risk and the 
management of liquidity and reserves. Most economic agents accumulate stores of value 
for emergencies or to take advantage of future investment opportunities. In the absence 
of attractive domestic financial assets, they are forced to hold foreign currencies, real 
estate, and other tangible assets (livestock, inventories, jewelry) that yield low social 
returns. The financial system reduces the costs and risks of holding precautionary and 
speculative reserves when it offers attractive forms of holding wealth. At the same time, 
it reduces the size of the required reserves, provided that it offers unused open lines of 
credit when needed, and thus releases resources for immediately productive uses. 16 
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Finally, the financial system provides services of fiscal support for the public 
sector. This is an important contribution in the developing countries, in view of weak 
tax systems and of the absence of markets for securities, where governments could place 
their paper. While the first three functions (monetization, intermediation, and risk pooling 
and reserve management) are complementary, this fiscal function of the financial system 
may be in conflict with the former three. When abused, this fiscal role may lead to in-
flation, devaluation, and the crowding out of the private sector from domestic credit 
portfolios. When this happens, the financial system ceases to be an intermediary between 
private savers and investors and it becomes a fiscal instrument to tax resources away 
from depositors, in order to finance the public-sector's current expenditures. 17 
In summary, economic development depends upon the growth and diversification 
of the financial system. Financial deepening matters to the extent to which it integrates 
markets, provides incentives for savings and investment, encourages savers to hold a 
larger proportion of their wealth in the form of domestic financial assets, rather than in 
unproductive inflation hedges, foreign assets, and other money substitutes; and channels 
resources away from low-return towards better alternative uses. 
The financial sector draws labor and other factors of production away from other 
uses. Its operations thus have a high opportunity cost, justified only to the extent to 
which the financial services produced increase the productivity of other available 
resources. The extent to which these services are provided depends upon the size of the 
financial system in real terms; that is, on the purchasing power of domestic financial 
assets. It also depends on the efficiency of its performance, as measured by the 
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magnitude and dispersion of the transactions costs that are imposed on all market par-
ticipants, actual and potential. 
Market fragmentation, the small size of the transactions, the high costs of infor-
mation, and risk and uncertainty increase the costs of financial transactions in the 
developing countries. As a result, the net returns to depositors are low, the total costs 
of the funds to borrowers (including their non-interest expenses) are high, the size of 
financial markets is small, the volume of the funds channelled and the variety of the ser-
vices provided are limited, and time horizons are short. Wide intermediation margins 
are not sufficient to cover the costs of most financial institutions. 
Financial progress in the developing countries requires a reduction of these risks 
and transactions costs, through greater competition and market integration, the exploita-
tion of economies of scale and of economies of scope, professional portfolio manage-
ment and portfolio diversification, the accumulation of information, and the establish-
ment of bank-customer relationships. Financial progress thus requires a hospitable 
regulatory and macroeconomic policy environment, viable institutions, and innovations in 
financial technology, in order to reduce risks and transactions costs. 18 
After the new international development organizations were established in the 
. early post-war years, domestic development banks and special credit programs were 
created in the developing countries, in order to facilitate the channelling of foreign sav-
ings towards target groups and for specific purposes. Although these institutions were 
introduced in an attempt to bypass domestic financial repression, they contributed little 
to alleviate it. Rather, in many instances they actually increased market fragmentation 
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as well as the transaction costs imposed on all market participants in the developing 
countries. 19 
Development financial institutions have not, on any significant scale, mobilized 
deposits or provided any other financial services except for the disbursement of loans, 
usually at below-market interest rates, for a narrow range of uses. They have been 
incomplete, truncated financial institutions, merely "lending windows" for international 
donors and domestic governments, to disburse loans at terms and conditions imposed 
from outside. 
Dependency on foreign and government funds, with the accompanying political 
intrusion, have seriously undermined their institutional viability. Financial services of 
poor quality as well as high transaction costs, due to targeting and non-price rationing, 
have not attracted a loyal clientele; arrears and default have represented substantial 
portions of their portfolios. Their very limited degree of portfolio diversification has 
further contributed to the high risks assumed and to their eventual insolvency. 
These development financial institutions have been a major example of the 
negative impact of foreign financial assistance on the development of domestic financial 
markets. By offering cheap loans, but not deposit facilities, they have ignored the 
important role of intermediation. Their dependence on external funds has limited their 
access to market information and it has prevented the development of bank-customer 
relationships, essential for efficient portfolio management. As a result, they have been 
perceived as ''benevolent intrusions to be exploited." 20 They have not survived the 
recent financial crises. 
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Crisis and Foreip Financial Assistance 
The economic experience of the Central American and of other developing 
countries during the late 1970s and early 1980s has been dominated by large external 
shocks and the accompanying balance of payments crises. Major examples were the two 
oil shocks and the coffee boom of the 1970s, followed by the world recession of the early 
1980s. Usually, such crises have necessitated a reduction in the level of aggregate 
current expenditures. 
The traditional view in these cases has been that, if the proper stabilization-and-
adjustment measures are undertaken, the country may be able to obtain additional 
foreign financial assistance, as well as other resource inflows, which could allow a gra-
dual, rather than a sudden reduction in real expenditures. Under the assumption of 
concave adjustment costs, orthodox economic theory can show that, with any rate of 
social time preference greater than the cost of foreign borrowing, the gradual approach, 
when it is feasible, must dominate any sudden shock treatment. That is, it may be 
possible to alleviate the crisis by persuading foreign creditors to extend more credit and 
foreign donors to provide more aid. 21 
The critical question is to determine, therefore, how quickly any country should 
adjust after it experiences an adverse external shock, such as a major deterioration in its 
international terms of trade, that results in a balance of payments that is not sustainable 
in the medium term. As one option, the country can attempt to close the gap rather 
quickly, with strong contractionary policies and rapid exchange-rate devaluation. If the 
elasticity of response of the tradable sector is low in the short run, most of the ad-
justment will have to come from the contractionary policies and from reduced 
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consumption. The orthodox view in this case is that it would pay the country to borrow 
during the first years, when foreign exchange is scarce, against the medium term, when 
the adjustment to the new external situation has taken place, and in this way choose a 
less costly transition path. 22 
Because time is required for the movement of productive factors and of consump-
tion patterns, the short-term effect of the shock will be an overshooting of the value of 
foreign exchange, in comparison to its new long-term equilibrium level. If the economy 
were to adjust instantaneously to the new equilibrium value of the exchange rate, there 
would be no justification for the extra borrowing. If that is not the case, it would then 
pay to borrow during the first years of the transition after the shock, against the period 
when the scarcity price of foreign exchange is lower, because the full resource and 
demand reallocations have already taken place. This more gradual approach to close the 
deficit thus requires extra external borrowing (or foreign aid). 
This is represented in Figure 1, adapted from Martin and Selowsky. The left-
hand side depicts the market for foreign exchange, where E0 is the equilibrium exchange 
rate before the shock. S1 and D1 reflect the short-run supply and demand for foreign 
exchange immediately after the shock. If the excess demand for foreign exchange were 
to be immediately closed, the new market rate would be E3• Because that is not the 
case, the new short-term rate will be at E1• As resources are reallocated, both supply 
and demand increase their elasticity of response, gradually rotating around the original 
level of the exchange rate, until the long-term equilibrium is achieved at E3• External 
borrowing would make it possible to smooth out the path of adjustment, as shown on the 
right-hand side of Figure 1. This path depends on the speed at which resources move. 
Borrowing is equivalent, in this case, to higher elasticities of response. 
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The key implicit assumption of this analysis is, however, that changes in the 
elasticity of supply and demand are exogenous and only a function of time. Therefore, 
when the extra borrowing evens out the path of the exchange rate, it is assumed that this 
smoothing does not affect the speed at which the short-run values converge to the long-
run equilibrium levels. The increase in the elasticity of response is assumed to be 
independent of the path of prices or of prevailing incentives. Concern with the impact 
of foreign financial assistance, on the other hand, grows out from the perception that 
these elasticities are endogenous and that they may tend to decline with the inflows of 
foreign funds. 
The Political Economy of Balance of Payments Crises 
Once the endogeneity of the elasticities of reponse is recognized, ample access 
to foreign financial assistance during a balance-of-payments crisis may not necessarily be 
welfare improving. To show this, it becomes necessary to explore the origin and nature 
of the crisis, as well as the behavior of the authorities and the behavior of private 
economic agents during the process of adjustment, in a political economy context. 
Orthodox neoclassical economic analysis assumes disembodied, altruistic policy-
makers, who maximize a social welfare function, subject to the usual resource and tech-
nological constraints. By contrast, the new political economy approaches view the state 
as composed of clusters of self-regarding individuals and groups, interacting strategically 
with other private agents. 23 Economic policies then reflect some combination of the 
objectives of the policymakers themselves and the objectives of vested-interest groups 
organized to exercise pressure over the policymakers, weighted by their relative political 
strength. 24 
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Most balance of payments crises are in large part crises of the public sector and 
reflect misjudgements about the appropriate and feasible size and composition of the 
state. They may reflect excess absorption generated by monetary expansion accompanying 
government expenditure during the political cycle. 25 They may also reflect an increase 
in government expenditures that is unsustainable over the long run. This will occur if 
the government misjudges the size of future annual foreign exchange flows that result 
from a positive shock, such as the coffee boom, and commits itself to unsustainable 
consumption-support programs, which would need to be cut back if there were any falling 
off in the expected foreign exchange rents. 
Crises may also reflect the creation of politically-determined entitlements to 
current and future income streams for various groups in the economy, such as tax 
holidays for protected manufactures, subsidized credit for small farmers, food subsidies 
for low-income households, and above-market wages for public-sector employees. The 
gradual expansion of these politically-determined entitlements creates specific "property 
rights." These entitlements are difficult to eliminate; they can be removed only at a high 
political cost. Since they represent explicit or implicit subsidies to particular groups, 
that have to be paid for by explicit or implicit taxation of other groups. Given very 
inelastic public-sector revenues, these expenditure commitments lead to fiscal deficits 
that become chronic. These deficits can only be financed by foreign borrowing, domestic 
borrowing, or the levying of the inflation tax. 
The Central American countries have tried all three methods of financing a 
growing public sector, with dire consequences. Domestic borrowing to close the fiscal 
gap has crowded out private investment in credit portfolios and has reduced the rate of 
• 
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growth of income. Inflaction has repressed the domestic financial system, which has 
shrunk due to currency substitution and other mechanisms of inflation tax avoidance. 
Financing the deficit with foreign savings was the preferred strategy in the mid-1970s, 
when international credit was abundant and real interest rates were low and even 
negative. Many believed that this was a costless method for financing public-sector 
deficits. 
The ability of these countries to service this external debt declined, however, when 
world real interest rates rose, while their ability to generate the required fiscal and trade 
surpluses to service the debt was limited both by an unfavorable international environ-
ment and by distorting domestic policies, characterized by the strong anti-export bias 
that resulted from the protectionist import-substitution industrialization strategies adopted 
earlier. When foreign lending abruptly ceased in the early 1980s, the chronic fiscal 
imbalance became a financial crisis. This was the case in Costa Rica and in the other 
Central American nations. 
Promotion of manufacturing in the context of the Central American Common 
Market initially accelerated growth in the mid-1960s, as a result of increased trade. By 
the mid-1970s, the easy stages of import substitution had been exhausted, new exports 
had been discouraged, distortions had slowed down the growth of productivity, the 
accumulation of entitlements had added to existing distortions, while decentralized public-
sector agencies became pressure groups in their own right and claimed substantial shares 
of available resources. 26 
The difficulties brought about by the first oil shock were soon overcome through 
accelerating foreign borrowing, followed almost immediately by the coffee boom. Coffee 
18 
prices quadrupled. Costa Rica's international terms of trade, for example, increased 45 
percent between 1975 and 1977. Real aggregate income increased rapidly. Accelerating 
foreign borrowing, on top of the extraordinary expansion of export earnings, substantially 
increased all categories of spending. With the euphoria, consumption and imports grew 
rapidly, while public-sector spending grew even more quickly, beyond levels that could 
be sustained under normal circumstances, much less during the recession that followed. 
Last year, Neil Harl warned about "decisionmakers that can be lulled into 
economic complacency and confidence by forces that appear permanent but are clearly 
not sustainable." 27 He attributed this tendency to psychological biases in favor of good 
news. Political economy forces may explain this behavior, as well. The coffee boom 
created new opportunities for the proliferation of politically-determined entitlements, 
granted by short-sighted politicans, mostly interested in their short-term prospects for re-
election. 
At the end of the coffee boom, with a deterioration of these countries' inter-
national terms of trade, and a world recession that required major adjustments, the 
authorities found it difficult to bring the rate of growth of spending downwards, to a level 
consistent with the new circumstances. In Costa Rica, the powerful manufacturing sector, 
extremely dependent on imported inputs, was prepared to block constraints on imports, 
in order to defent its entitlements. Strong public-sector unions were ready to block 
attempts at fiscal austerity. The authorities thus chose to postpone the adjustment, by 
heavily borrowing abroad. When foreign inflows dried up, inflation and devaluation 
followed. 28 
• 
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During the early stages of the crisis, the reduction in the economy's real income 
necessitated the adoption of expenditure-reducing policies, a mild devaluation, and a 
reduction of the fiscal deficit. The authorities choose to transform the fiscal deficit into 
a foreign debt issue, instead. This decision compromised future growth, for the sake of 
sustaining an artificial level of consumption for a few years more. 
Access to foreign savings strengthened the reluctance of the authorities to devalue, 
even when the domestic currency had become highly overvalued. As a result, those with 
access to the scarce foreign exchange enjoyed a valuable entitlement. In the end, this 
was a subsidy for the massive capital flight that took place. The returns from the 
externally borrowed resources were thereby privatized, while service of the foreign debt 
was socialized. Indeed, the public sector has been forced in recent years to cut back on 
the supply of basic services, in order to amortize and pay interest on this debt. 
Conclusion 
Under ideal circumstances, foreign financial assistance has added to domestic 
savings and has thus contributed to economic growth in the developing countries. Under 
less ideal circumstances, the foreign funds may have sustained growth-reducing policies 
in many countries. These foreign transfers may have made it possible for too large and 
bureaucratic public sectors to come about. In extreme cases, this assistance may have 
made it possible for the public sector to enter into productive activities, better left to the 
discipline of the market, in direct competition with existing or potential private investors. 
Financed with foreign savings, these state-owned enterprises may have severely crowded 
out private firms in credit portfolios and in access to specific resources. Characterized 
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by high capital-output ratios, these productive ventures of the public sector had added 
little to social profitability. 
In particular, abundant foreign financial assistance may have neutralized the 
healthy impact of crises on the evolution of economic policies. By bailing governments 
out, foreign aid has allowed the persistence of unsustainable entitlements and distorting 
policies; foreign aid has made possible the postponement of the eventual day of reckon-
ing. Postponement of the necessary and inevitable adjustment has actually increased, 
rather than reduced, the social costs of a vulnerability to external shocks. 
What is important to recognize is that the nature and extent of the macro-
economic stabilization and policy adjustment programs, made inevitable by a crisis, is not 
independent from the amounts of foreign aid that become available. Too much aid 
weakens the will for reform. 
Most of the plans and programs for economic recovery in Central America have 
assigned no active role to the domestic financial systems. At best, the local financial 
intermediaries have been perceived as convenient conduits to channel foreign funds, in 
order to take advantage of existing institutions and of established networks of bank 
branches. Domestic deposit mobilization has been ignored, and most likely discouraged 
by cheap foreign funds. Too much concessional financial assistance takes incentives to 
mobilize domestic savings away. Too much foreign assistance may make it possible to 
postpone overdue reforms, needed for financial development. The task of economic 
growth and development is complex and the road to be travelled is long. Foreign 
financial assistance will help for the journey only if it does not substitute for some of the 
essential domestic ingredients. 
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